vortiya.blogg.se

• Front mission 2 surrender conditions free#

In reporting this action to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, he suggested that the USSR be informed. At this time, reports came from agents in Denmark that Generaloberst Georg Lindemann, German armed forces commander in Denmark ( Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Daenemark), was willing to surrender the army there, but would not include SS and police units, Although the Supreme Commander authorized efforts through unofficial channels to get additional details of the proposal, he forbade Allied officers to be present at the conversations. Not until mid-April were peace feelers concerning the surrender of forces in northwest Europe communicated to the Supreme Commander. 3Ĭount Bernadotte's conditions were not met and the Schellenberg suggestion was not passed on to SHAEF. The Swedish nobleman declared that he would go to the Supreme Commander only after Himmler announced: (1) that he had been chosen as German leader by Hitler (2) that the Nazi party was dissolved (3) that the Werewolf organization had been disbanded and (4) that all Danish and Norwegian prisoners had been sent to Sweden. Schellenberg pointed to possible developments in Germany which might shake Hitler's position, and said that in such a case Himmler wanted Bernadotte to go to General Eisenhower and ask for the negotiation of a surrender. The count refused to act in this capacity, insisting that Himmler would have to take the initiative. Bernadotte, who was in Germany attempting to get Norwegian and Danish prisoners released into the custody of Sweden, was asked if he would discuss with General Eisenhower the possibility of arranging a capitulation. On 2 April Brigadeführer Walter Schellenberg of Himmler's Intelligence Service, apparently speaking only for himself and without Himmler's authority, approached Count Folke Bernadotte, head of the Swedish Red Cross. The first important overtures in northwest Europe were made by members of Himmler's staff. However, the suspicion aroused in the mind of Marshal Stalin and hisĪdvisers created an atmosphere of distrust which was to surround most of the peace negotiations in northwest Europe. Delays in the negotiations ultimately postponed any final action in Italy until the last week of the war, with the result that the surrender activities had no direct effect on the war in northwest Europe. Roosevelt characterized the statements given Stalin by his informants as "vile misrepresentations." So strong were the feelings engendered that some Allied leaders wondered at the time if the purpose of the German negotiators was to split the anti-Nazi forces. Roosevelt and, when the latter assured him that nothing was being done against the USSR's interest, declared that the President was not being kept informed by his generals.

Front mission 2 surrender conditions free#

As his suspicions deepened, he became worried over a possible peace settlement between the Western powers and Germany which would leave the enemy free to continue the war against the Red Army. Despite this frank approach, Marshal Stalin became disturbed as the talks in Switzerland progressed.

Allied authorities in Italy promptly informed the Russians of these talks and asked them to nominate officers to attend future peace conferences if they should be arranged. More substantial overtures, looking to final surrender of German forces in Italy, were made in early February by representatives of the German command in northern Italy, who arranged for meetings in Switzerland with Allied agents. Von Schmieden found it impossible to establish proper connections, and Hesse reported that his efforts were ruined because of publicity concerning his mission. Hesse to Stockholm to make contact with Allied representatives for the purpose of discussing a negotiated settlement. Informal steps toward peace had been taken in mid-January 1945 when Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop on his own initiative sent Dr.

In the week of fighting that remained, while Hitler's successor debated his best course of action and sent representatives to sound out the Western Allies, individual enemy commanders made piecemeal surrenders along a wide front. HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Supreme Command (ETO) Chapter XXVĪt the beginning of May, the Western Allies and the USSR had virtually destroyed the German fighting machine and were engaged in the task of mopping up the disorganized elements remaining in central Germany.